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Abstract 
 
We consider two classical sources from Ancient India as possible sources for tackling the 
lack of ethics in governance and business in emerging markets today. First, Arthashastra is a 
treatise on economics and politics written by Kautilya, the advisor to the Mauryan emperor 
Chandragupta during the fourth century BC. Kautilya provided practical recommendations 
like providing high and fair compensations to civil servants. It is suggested that the existing 
wage structure creates feeling of inequity in government employees and is likely to lead to 
inefficiency and corruption. Second, Thirukkural is a classic of rhyming Tamil couplets, 
possibly written around the year 31 BC, by Thiruvalluvar, a common weaver born in 
Mylapore, near present-day Chennai. It is one of the most revered ancient works in the Tamil 
language, providing a guide for human morals and betterment in life. Like Adam Smith and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thiruvalluvar stated that ethical values coincide with a good 
economy and that therefore a free market is necessary. Basically humans are naturally good 
and contribute positively to the economy. In conclusion, while Kautilya gave pragmatic 
advice to tackle human’s destructive economic instincts, Thiruvalluvar assumed the natural 
goodness of men and warned against institutional interference. 
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Introduction 
 
The anti-social and uncooperative behavior of both private and government economic players 
has in general been identified as a main cause of the economic crisis since 2008. Meanwhile, 
in emerging markets corruption in public life is still considered as one of the most pressing 
issues. For instance in India governments are often plagued by series of scams which provide 
an excuse for opposition parties to disrupt parliamentary proceedings. Various civil society 
organizations have stirred the public awareness of the issue of corruption. Available literature 
is full of suggestions for dealing with the black economy (Kumar, 1999). Indian governments 
have already tried out a range of schemes like amnesty, tax cuts, demonetization and 
acquisition of undervalued properties, all of them with very poor results. Certainly one of the 
reasons for corruption in emerging democracies is the management of bureaucracy and 
specifically their incentives to perform in an ethical manner (Rose-Ackerman, 1986). 
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There is also the general observation by many critics that the lack of ethical awareness among 
both public and private economic players has to do with the economics curriculum and 
economic textbooks which are used in India and worldwide. Surveys reflect that on average, 
economists and economics students behave in a more self-interested way than others. In 
different experiments they tend to deviate from the moral good and are more corrupt. In India 
too some scholars look for spirituality as a solution to this behavioral problem. Shrikant 
(2014) argues to teach more spirituality, ethics, philosophy, and history in business schools. 
Too often a long historical experience regarding economic ethics in general and corruption 
more specifically is completely ignored. 
 
What we suggest here is that historical sources may be useful as a source of inspiration for 
solving today’s ethical issues regarding corruption and the black economy in general and in 
emerging markets more specifically. Two ancient Indian classics, Arthashastra and 
Thirukkural, are taken as case-studies, as they provide different answers. 
 
The Origin of Indian Bureaucracy and Corruption 
 
Indian independence in 1947 brought a structural change in the role of the state. Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to modernize and humanize a traditional society through 
state intervention in all important spheres of its activity. To meet these challenges the 
bureaucracy was expanded rapidly. Bureaucratic government institutions, rules and 
procedures from the British rule, however, remained largely intact, producing a mismatch 
between obsolete instruments and modern tasks. Unprecedented amounts of money became 
available to official agencies for spending on various programs and projects.  As a result, 
corruption spread in the public services. The interaction with contractors and suppliers 
opened new avenues of making illicit gains. As the private sector grew side by side with the 
public sector, the scope for bribery enlarged. The complexities of export-import business and 
the temptation to evade taxes and manipulate duties were essential to the growth of 
corruption opportunities. The rise in disposable incomes of the business class increased their 
appetite for gold, luxury goods and imported items. This, in turn, stimulated smuggling and 
created new opportunities for mega corruption. Never before in India’s modern history the 
level of corruption was so high. India scored 3.1 out of 10 on corruption and was ranked 95
th
 
out 183 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (Indian 
Express, 2011). That corruption is not a part of Indian business and political culture is 
illustrated by the fact that non-resident Indians abroad are usually considered very disciplined 
and honest. 
 
The underlying cause of India’s corruption is complex. A complete lack of ethics certainly 
lies at the root of the problem. Clearly, there was a common platform to create a generally 
accepted moral, social and political code of behavior for every economic actor. What 
“dharma” or “righteousness” is to Hindus, “deen” or “moral conduct” is to Muslims. 
However, the potential for uniting ethical values and codes was completely ignored in favor 
of a so-called secularism protecting the rights of minorities that allowed communal groups to 
manifest themselves and emphasize differences instead of similarities. Srivastava (2001, p. 
35) claims “that without a uniting and coalescing ethical component, secularism tended to 
create a dispersed and amoral society as well as an amoral polity, adrift without an anchor, 
without any generally accepted or acknowledged moral or social or political code for 
everybody”.  Another reason for corruption in India despite traditional ethical values is due to 
the intermingling of the idealized values and the social realities of India, more specifically a 
scarcity of resources, which led to a self-centered orientation for those in power (Sinha, 1997; 
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2008).  The problem of bureaucratic corruption was exacerbated by the fact that Indian 
bureaucrats carried a colonial mindset including a distrust of natives and hence highly 
centralized decision-making which led to concentration in the power of a few (Sinha, 1997). 
 
The size of the Indian government in terms of number of employees has been steadily 
increasing from 1.8 million employees in 1956 to 4.16 million employees in 1991 
(Maheshwari, 2001). Within the Indian bureaucracy, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 
consisting of 4,377 officers (Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions 2012), is 
the most important in terms of social prestige and having access to the senior most positions 
in the administrative set up (Maheshwari, 2001, p. 316). In the year 2011 alone, IAS officers 
were charged with corruption in 15 cases and 11 IAS officers were booked by the India’s 
highest criminal investigation agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation for corruption 
(India Today, 2012). In this paper, we argue that the low pay levels and highly egalitarian pay 
structure of India’s bureaucracy may also have contributed to the rise of corruption. The 
relatively low salaries for public servants were an open invitation to create a political market 
instead of a transparent economic market. Clientelism became the rule actually enforcing 
communal identification.  
 
 
Kautilya’s Pragmatic Views on Economic Ethics and Compensation 
 
The issue of good governance is discussed in Kautilya’s Arthashastra, India’s classic text on 
the art of politics and government. Kautilya was the first classical philosopher who explicitly 
tackled economic issues. He was the brilliant and unscrupulous Brahmin adviser of the first 
Maurya emperor, Chandragupta Maurya who reigned from 324 to 301 BC. over India. 
Chandragupta had overthrown the reigning king of the prosperous kingdom of Magadha, in 
Northern India, and had seized its capital, Pataliputra (the modern city of Patna, in the state of 
Bihar). The Maurya dynasty was to weld the diverse cultures of India into an empire lasting 
almost 140 years. 
 
What makes a classical scholar like Kautilya relevant for today’s issues of economic ethics 
and more specifically on compensation and corruption? Many scholars have argued that 
Kautilya was a pioneer economist also from a world history perspective. Jha and Jha (1998) 
conclude that Arthashastra is a monumental treatise of the ancient world that possesses great 
importance in the history of economics. Research on Arthashastra started when a complete 
manuscript of the work was discovered and published by R. Shama Sastry in 1908. Ghoshal 
and Radhagovinda (2006) further analyzed Arthashastra for the 1937 first edition of the 
Cultural Heritage of India, published by the Ramakrishna Mission in Calcutta. These were 
general surveys which regarded the text as “the branch of knowledge which deals with the 
acquisition and preservation of dominion” (Ghoshal and Radhagovinda, 2006, p. 451). 
 
The traditional focus of analysis of Arthashastra was on the role of the state and the 
organisation of society (Deva, 1984), mostly concluding that the Mauryan economy can only 
be interpreted in a Marxist way. Scholars have emphasized that Kautilya categorically 
reaffirms the sanctity of the varna (or caste) hierarchy which Buddhist thought had called in 
doubt. But Kautilya also argued that the caste system can only exist as part of a system to 
create “wealth”. Arthashastra literally means “the science of wealth”. Despite its title, it was 
not an enquiry into the causes of the wealth of nations, but rather a work on polity offering 
advice to the ruler on how to increase and preserve his wealth and power. However, Kautilya 
has been identified by some Indian scholars as the inventor of “economics” as a separate 
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discipline. They usually refer to the terms he used in his treatise. The concept of artha 
(wealth) as one of the important goals in life sets the background of his economic thinking. 
The concept of vartha reflects the national economy, including agriculture, husbandry and 
commerce, while the concept of arthashastra combined economics, politics, ethics, war and 
law. This may be described as “human sciences” in the 21st C. Another important feature of 
Arthashastra is that it contains a revolutionary theory of value: it results from the utility and 
the scarcity of the product. 
 
According to Dasgupta (1993) Kautilya’s approach had something in common with that of 
writers belonging to the “Cameralist” school in 17th C Germany, also confirming the present 
approach of the Norvegian economist Erik S. Reinert (Jomo & Reinert, 2005). They too were 
concerned with “administrative and policy studies”, the so-called “Kameral-wissenschaft”, 
rather than economic policy as such, regarding themselves as consultant administrators. Both 
of them favoured strengthening unification and centralisation of the state, within its own 
relatively limited territory. They emphasized the vital importance of social cohesion and 
believed that a major objective of economic policy was the raising of tax revenue for the 
state. 
 
The role of the state includes a labour code (it is debatable whether this was like introducing 
a welfare state), a proper taxation system which should not oppress people (while government 
revenues should be derived from economic participation in selected economic sectors like 
diamond, gold, silver and heavy metals), and finally a regulating role in production, 
distribution, trade, and consumption. This also involved building roads along which goods to 
be traded could be carried, as well as measures for providing security to traders while 
travelling. To promote trade considerable attention was given to textiles which were partly in 
private hands. However, the state was expected to engage in production of textiles on an 
extensive scale, and to maintain strict control and supervision of that part of the industry 
which was in private hands (Jhingan, Girija, Manimekalai, & Sasikala, 2006). 
 
In many ways these characteristics were comparable to those of Ancient Greece. However, 
there were also striking differences. First, interest had no negative connotation in Kautilya’s 
thinking. He actually considered 15 % to be ideal. Second, Ancient Greece was based on 
slaves for cheap labour, while Ancient India was based on a joint family system and a caste 
system, which was, however, still relatively flexible. We may conclude that Kautilya was 
already more advanced as far as capital formation and social protection are concerned. This 
confirms Dasgupta’s conclusions that he may be compared to 15th to 18th C West-European 
cameralists as described by Reinert (Jomo & Reinert, 2005). 
 
Some Marxist scholars in India like (1958; see Dasgupta, 1993) also interpreted Kautilya’s 
thinking as advocating a new and radical agrarian policy. Kautilya was described as being 
against landlordism and in favour of cultivation by small owner-farmers. However, these 
interpretations can be debatable. In general Arthashastra recognises the existence of both 
state-owned and privately owned agricultural land. What can be observed is that, as a result 
of economic growth during the Maurya-period, trade and commerce began weaning away a 
large number of Vaisyas (castes involved in commerce and manufacture) from agriculture to 
trade, and more and more Sudras (outcasts) were required to replace them. Kautilya 
recognized these tendencies by extending the duties of the Sudras and by expressing a 
favourable opinion about the lower varnas. 
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At the same time it should be noted that, unlike some Buddhist and Tamil sources (confer 
infra), Kautilya did not directly refer to ethics. His statements are of an instrumental rather 
than a normative nature. Here again, there is no contradiction with the 18th C Mercantilist 
and Cameralist traditions in Western Europe. Kautilya considered economic activities as an 
essential need for which both the state and the individual had to play an important part. He is 
not bothered by the Bagavad Gita’s quest for ethical activities but his ideas also do not 
contradict the Gita. His proposal for a wage scale reflects his insistence on a stable 
government.  
 
Kautilya’s concept of what is good governance is reflected in his approach to compensation 
of official administrators. Scholars have already considered this from two angles. First, the 
issue became relevant when the state visualized in Arthashastra was compared to present day 
India. Avari (2007) concludes that the hierarchy of officers controlling the bureaucracy must 
have been extremely elaborate and finely graded, and that one can see in it the antecedents of 
the hierarchy at the court of the great Mogul or the British viceroy. Thapar (2006) focuses 
more specifically on Kautilya’s recommendation that senior officers receive forty-eight times 
the salary of a clerk, and ministers double that. The ratio of the clerk’s salary to that of the 
chief minister or of the humble soldier to the commander was approximately 1:96. According 
to Avari (2007) these figures and the severe punishments for misdeeds and corruption, as 
described in Arthashastra, suggest that it was most unlikely that the Mauryan state could be 
defrauded by the people or its officials. This is in striking contrast to the taxation and other 
regimes prevalent since the second half of the 20th century in South Asian countries. 
 
Rangarajan’s (1987) translation and commentary on the Arthasharstra provides details on the 
principles of salary fixation and actual salaries of government servants during the time of 
Kautilya (pp. 288-293). Totally twelve grades of government servants are listed ranging from 
the servants who tend the animals to senior-most advisors in the King’s court. Of the twelve 
grades described by Rangarajan, we have selected only the top eight grades since they deal 
with the salaries of officers. The ninth grade consists of accountants and clerks which are out 
of the purview of this study. The details of the salaries of the first eight grades are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Salaries of Government Officials in Kautilya’s Arthashastra 
Grade Annual Salary (in panas) Representative Positions within Civil Services 
1 1,000 Heads of departments of civil service 
2 2,000 King’s physician, Chief Engineer 
3 3,000 Nil 
4 4,000 Forester, Chief Superintendent of Productive Forests 
5 8,000 Magistrates 
6 12,000 Ministers, Governor General of the City, Head of 
manufacturing establishment, Provincial Governors, 
Governors of frontier regions, City commandant 
7 24,000 The Chancellor, The Treasurer 
8 48,000 Officiating priest, King’s guru, Councilors 
Source: Rangarajan (1987, pp. 288-293) 
 
We suggest to compare Kautilya’s recommendations to pay levels and the pay structure in 
today’s Indian bureaucracy. The Indian bureaucracy consists of an elite cadre called as the 
Indian Administrative Service (IAS). The salaries of IAS officers are determined based on the 
recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission as adopted by the Department of 
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Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, of the 
Government of India. The pay of IAS officers has four components: basic pay (reflecting the 
gradual increase of pay within the same range), grade pay (reflecting the officer’s status or 
level), allowances and benefits, and finally long-term benefits such as gratuity, pension, and 
other social schemes. 
 
The concept of “cost to company” (CTC) has become popular in India since the 1990s and it 
includes the total cost incurred by an organization for an employee such as salary, variable 
pay, benefits, retrials, and training costs. Similar to the concept of CTC, Premarajan, Rao, 
and Gurunathan (n.d.) have defined a concept called “cost to government” (CTG) to indicate 
the total costs incurred by the government in employing a person. While a media report 
(Sinha, 2008) indicates that the actual cost to government can be up to four times the figure 
on the salary slip, the average multiplier to the basic salary to arrive at the CTG for general 
government employees is 3.56 (Premarajan, Rao, & Gurunathan, n.d., p. 135). Based on this 
we have calculated the range of the CTG for each of the levels (Ministry of Personnel, 2000). 
 
Using the procedure suggested by Bloom (1999) and used by Brown, Sturman, and 
Simmering (2003) we then calculated the Gini coefficient for the IAS officer cadre as 0.1961. 
Since the Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1, this seems to be rather low indicating an 
egalitarian wage distribution. The fact that the government strives to maintain an egalitarian 
wage structure is clearly mentioned in the Sixth Pay Commission Report which has fixed the 
ratio of the maximum to the minimum salaries to 1:12 (Government of India, 2008, p. 43). 
 
While there are theories such as tournament and equity theory, which suggest the economic 
and psychological factors determining an individual’s reaction to the pay structure, there are 
hardly any studies which suggest the actual level of hierarchy in a pay structure. There have 
been some attempts at empirically arriving at the level of hierarchy. For example, Mahoney 
(1979) and Elliot Jaques (cited by Kleiner, 2001) recommend salaries for individuals in a 
hierarchy based on employees’ perceptions of a fair wage for all the jobs in the hierarchy. 
Here we suggest to consider the views of Kautilya and extrapolate his recommendations to 
the Indian bureaucracy of today.  
 
The salaries mentioned by Kaultilya are in the currency of his days, i.e., panas. Fortunately, 
Kautilya also provides us with a mechanism to derive the current equivalent of the salary in 
Mauryan times. In Arthashastra, {5.3.34} it is mentioned that “an annual salary of 60 panas 
is equal to one adhaka of grain per day” (Rangarajan, 1987, p. 288). Elsewhere, in 
Arthashastra {2.15.43} it is mentioned that one adhaka is “enough for four meals for one 
Arya male” (Rangarajan, 1987, p. 750). According to the Government of India Planning 
Commission (2012) individuals in urban areas earning less than Rs. 10,314.20 per annum are 
considered to be “below the poverty line.” By equating a sum of 60 panas per annum to the 
poverty line estimate of Rs. 10,314.20 per annum, we can estimate the value of one pana as 
Rs. 171.90 in today’s prices. 
 
Since there was a considerable controversy about the level of this poverty line (Economic 
Times, 2012), we can assume that this would understate the actual value of the panna in 
today’s terms. The value of the salaries of government officials in Rupees as suggested by 
Kautilya compared to the actual salaries of IAS officers in India today is shown in Table 2. In 
the table, the values suggested by Kautilya have been converted into CTG equivalents using 
the same conversion factor, i.e., 3.56. This assumes that the ratio of allowances and benefits 
to the basic wages was the same in Kautilya’s time as it is now. 
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Table 2: Comparing Salaries of Government Officials Suggested by Kautilya with 
Actual Salaries of IAS Officers 
Level Annual salary of 
government servants 
as recommended by 
Kautilya in terms of 
2012 values (in Rs. 
Per annum) 
Annual salary of 
government servants 
as recommended by 
Kautilya in terms of 
2012 values (in Rs. 
Per annum) CTG 
Equivalent 
Actual Salaries of 
IAS officers CTG 
equivalent 
Ratio of actual 
salaries of IAS 
officers to 
salaries 
recommended 
by Kautilya 
1 171,900 611,964 1,399,080 2.28 
2 343,800 1,223,928 1,450,344 1.18 
3 515,700 1,835,892 1,493,064 0.81 
4 687,600 2,447,856 2,601,648 1.06 
5 1,375,200 4,895,712 2,657,184 0.54 
6 2,062,800 7,343,568 2,742,624 0.37 
7 4,125,600 14,687,136 3,417,600 0.23 
8 8,251,200 29,374,272 3,844,800 0.13 
 
When we compare the salaries recommended by Kautilya with the existing salaries earned by 
IAS officers, we find that in the first two years of the government official’s career, the 
salaries earned are higher than or almost at par compared to those recommended by Kautilya. 
However, at the senior levels in the bureaucracy, the salaries earned by IAS officers in India 
today are a small fraction of those recommended by Kautilya for government officials. 
Using the procedure suggested by Bloom (1999) and used by Brown, Sturman, and 
Simmering (2003) we calculated the Gini coefficient for the CTG salaries recommended by 
Kautilya in Arthashastra as 0.5759. This is a rather high Gini coefficient indicating an 
extremely hierarchical wage distribution. 
 
What are the effects of the discrepancy between Kautilya’s recommendations and the current 
pay policy in the IAS? The pay levels of senior IAS officers (beyond 15 years of work 
experience) are a fraction of those recommended by Kautilya in his Arthashastra. In addition, 
the increase in salary as an IAS officer rises in the work levels within the IAS is much more 
egalitarian (a Gini coefficient of 0.19) as compared to the pay structure recommended by 
Kautilya in Arthashastra (Gini coefficient = 0.57). 
 
According to Adams’s (1963) equity theory, individuals compare the ratio of their outputs to 
their inputs with the ratio of others’ outputs to others’ inputs. When employees perceive an 
inequity in the ratio of outputs to inputs of self and others, they take steps to correct it. Job 
inputs can be in the form of qualifications, work experience, and performance and job outputs 
can be the form of tangible rewards such as compensation and benefits or intangible returns 
such as respect and recognition. If an individual feels that with respect to job inputs, the 
organization does not provide adequate outputs, he or she will take either work lesser, or seek 
to improve the outputs through other means (such as politicking or stealing) or will quit the 
job. Conversely, when employees perceive overpayment (as when they are paid efficiency 
wages), they work harder to correct the inequity. The tendency of humans to avoid inequity 
can explain the apparently contradictory findings of selfish and altruistic behavior (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999).  In a laboratory experiment, even monkeys have shown an aversion for 
inequity (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003) which leads us to conclude that this inherent aversion to 
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inequity was necessary for the development of cooperation amongst members of our species 
during evolution. 
 
Extending these insights to the organizational context, Greenberg (1990) described a field 
experiment where he compared the rate of employee theft at two plants during the period 
when wages were temporarily reduced by 15%. The plants where wages were reduced had 
significantly higher levels of employee theft as compared to the control plant, thereby 
illustrating that employees’ respond to underpayment inequity by increasing their outcomes. 
Another example of the damaging effects of pay inequity can be seen in the case of two large 
retailers in the USA, Walmart’s Sam’s Club and Costco. Costco pays substantially more 
compensation as well as medical and retirement benefits to its employees. Specifically, 
Costco pays an average wage of $17/hour while Sam’s Club pays the minimum wage of 
$10/hour. Costco’s generosity extends not just to cash wages but also to its health plan and 
retirement plan- 85% of Costco employees get a health plan worth $5735 per annum while 
only 47% of Sam’s Club employees get a health plan worth only $3500 per annum. Similarly, 
91% of Costco employees get a retirement plan worth $1330/annum while only 64% of 
Sam’s Club employees get a retirement plan worth only $747/annum. Given the extremely 
low wages at Sam’s club, it is not surprising that their shrinkage costs (wastage or losses due 
to negligence and neglect) are a staggering 1.7% of sales as compared to Costco’s 0.2% 
(Cascio, 2006). 
 
Since liberalization of the Indian economy in 1990, there has been a steep rise in managerial 
salaries driven by the increasing demand for managerial talent. Another factor that led to a 
sudden rise in salaries was a change in the Companies Act that drastically increased the limit 
on CEO compensation (Kakani & Ray, 2002). In this context, the issue of low salaries for 
IAS officers becomes even more serious. 
 
Given the low salaries and poor opportunities for economic growth, it is no wonder that the 
overall satisfaction of government servants with their pay and benefits is very low and even 
though they were quite satisfied with their job and were proud of being government servants, 
it did not compensate for their dissatisfaction with the poor pay and benefits. In fact, most of 
the government servants felt that their pay and promotion opportunities were not equitable 
and did not compensate them adequately for their contribution to their work (Premarajan, 
Rao, & Gurunathan, n.d.). 
 
 
Thiruvalluvar’s Spiritual Ethics 
 
It is interesting to note that Kautilya’s solutions to an ethical deficit in economic behavior, 
including corruption, are not shared by many other ancient Indian classics. Among them was 
Thiruvalluvar, Kautilya’s South Indian counterpart, who was a poet and philosopher, born in 
Mylapore, near present-day Chennai, possibly around the year 31 BC. Unlike Kautilya, who 
was a Brahmin, Thiruvalluvar was possibly a weaver, but when he took his great work, 
Tirukkural, to the assembly of Tamil scholars at Madurai for their approval, his fame 
immediately eclipsed that of other scholars in ancient South India. Whereas Arthashastra was 
pragmatic, Tirukkural seeks truth in religion and is consequently much more ethically 
oriented in a spiritual sense. Thiruvalluvar’s ethics do not accept the concepts of Buddhism 
and Jainism about the benefits of abandoning social and active life, and opting for 
renunciation as a better way of seeking enlightenment. He emphasized the need of prosperity 
for which three factors are indispensable: farmers (Land), merchants (Capital) and virtuous 
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people (Labour) (Tirukkural, chapter 74; Raj, n.d.). According to Valluvar wealth is 
productive of the joys of this world: 
 
“Wealth makes people important. Wealth acquired with proper means will yield 
virtues and happiness. All despise the poor, but all praise the rich… There is no 
sharper weapon than wealth to destroy the arrogance of one’s enemies. If wealth is 
used for noble purpose, it will earn peace and prosperity. The rich man glitters in the 
brightness of wealth. He enjoys life and visits places he likes in countries far and 
near” (Tirukkural, chapter 76). 
 
Clearly, Thiruvalluvar considered the acquisition of wealth as important and justified, and 
that it should not to be despised. In chapter 101 of the Tirukkural, Thiruvalluvar also 
considered “wasted wealth”: 
 
“He who hoards wealth and does not enjoy it or utilize it to benefit others, is as good 
as dead, and his wealth is a waste”. 
 
The most productive activity, according to Thiruvalluvar, is agriculture. Some elements of 
Tirukkural are similar to the “Green Revolution” which took place in India in the 1960s and 
1970s except high yielding variety of seeds: extent of ploughing, manure and fertilizers, 
water-management, weeding at the right time, and protection against pests and diseases. 
 
“If a man does not attend to his land personally, it will behave like an angry wife and 
yield him no pleasure” (Tirukkural, chapter 104). 
 
Thiruvalluvar’s emphasis on wealth may be connected to his attitude on poverty (Tirukkural, 
chapter 105). True freedom is interpreted as freedom from poverty. There is no dignity in 
being poor. Poverty leads to begging, which symbolizes evil: 
 
“There is nothing more disgraceful than begging; there is no greater folly than to 
remedy the evils of poverty by begging” (Thirukurral, chapters 106-107). 
 
This would suggest that Thiruvalluvar was against extreme inequalities, which Kautilya 
considered as a pragmatic tool against corruption. Also, like the Buddhists, Thiruvalluvar did 
endorse the fact that insatiable desires and greed are the basic causes of sorrow and pain in 
life. So wealth was only justified in fighting poverty. 
 
However, whether his inspiration came to some extent from Buddhism is difficult to 
determine. His inclination towards Shiva would identify him more as a Hindu than as a 
Buddhist. Many commentators suggest that he rose above all distinctions of creed. Most 
probably in 1
st
 C BC Tamil Nadu (during the so-called Sangham-period) Hinduism and 
Buddhism existed peacefully side by side. 
 
Thiruvalluvar’s conclusions were remarkable: he stated that ethical values coincide with a 
good economy and that therefore a free market is necessary.  Basically humans are naturally 
good and contribute positively to the economy. Naturally, comparisons to 18
th
 C 
Enlightenment philosophers like Genevan social philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
1778), and British economist Adam Smith (1723-1790), including his 19th C British 
utilitarian followers like Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and David Ricardo (1772-1823), 
come to mind. Also Thiruvalluvar’s emphasis on a limited role for the state encourages this 
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comparison. Actually Thiruvalluvar limited the states involvement to defence, social security 
and public works. On the other hand he considered self-sufficiency as extremely important 
and consequently agriculture is the basis of a sound economy. In this way he had more in 
common with 18 C French physiocrats (Jhingan, etc., 2006, p. 485-489). 
 
A cornerstone in Thiruvalluvar’s thinking concerns the concept of the original nature of man. 
Like many philosophers of the European Enlightenment Thiruvalluvar identified the state and 
the resulting society as the main cause of these destructive desires and greed. By neutralizing 
the unnatural forces of the state and society, and allowing one’s natural true self to emerge, 
life can be reformed and refined. This would enable a firm attitude of mind, allowing to 
neutralize greed and to resolute that “we do not need what we can do without” 
(Narayanaswamy, 2010, p. 18).  Thiruvalluvar described this as “stable nature”, “true 
knowledge”, “nature of the world”, or “proper procedures by the law of nature” (idem). 
These notions can easily be compared to Rousseau’s research on the relationship between 
the individual and society. Like Thiruvalluvar, Rousseau argued that the individual might 
retain an innate human goodness while remaining part of a corrupting collectivity: 
 
“Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man” (opening line in J.J. Rousseau, Émile ou de 
l’éducation, 1762). 
 
However, Thiruvalluvar suggested that the “nature of things” is only identified “after 
considerable thought, planning and analysis”. Then, “once a decision is taken, any hesitation 
or delay is suicidal” (Raj, n.d.; Thirukkural, chapters 64-68). 
 
In a natural society the Rule of Law would reign. This would allow good governance by law, 
based on “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the law”. It is the natural duty of 
the government to address people’s grievances, protect the people, and punish criminals. 
Thiruvalluvar compared a just government to the natural phenomenon of “rain”: “As is the 
world without rain, so is the country with unjust government”. Despite emphasizing the need 
for wealth he disapproved of interfering in the economy as this would result in abuse of 
power: “Prosperity gives more sorrow than poverty under unjust rule” (Thirukkural, chapters 
55-56; Raj, n.d.).  
 
In Thiruvalluvar’s time South India consisted of kingdoms. However, as the “king” was part 
of nature, he symbolized “justice” and “good and just government”. Everything is 
interconnected: the justice of the king will provide rich rains and harvests. If the top of the 
decision-making pyramid is corrupt than everything in the country will fail. “Harmony” is the 
key-word. Harmony provides “good governance”, and “good governance” allows harmony 
(Tirukurral, chapter 74). From this perpective Raj (n.d.) suggests that Tirukkural is, to a great 
extent, a utopia. Thurivalluvar may have referred to a qualitative different society to express 
his aspirations to establish new social relations among people. 
 
Thiruvalluvar agreed with Kautilya in emphasizing that government officials should not 
abuse their position. However, he believed that only individual transformation could solve the 
problem: “The enlightened and unblemished in positions of power dare not misuse their 
privileges to baser ends” (Narayanasamy, 2010, p. 203). In comparison Kautilya’s emphasis 
on higher compensation is much more pragmatic than Thiruvalluvar’s spiritual and purely 
ethical approach. 
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However, on the whole Thirukkural is basically philosophical prose emphasizing the virtues 
of proper human behaviour, learning, citizenship and an ascetic lifestyle. According to 
Thiruvalluvar, wealth is essential but it is only a means to an end, not an end in itself. But at 
the same time he argued “If you live, live to acquire fame and glory; if not, it is better not to 
live”. Albert Schweitzer (2006) concludes: “Like the Buddha and the Bhagavad-gita, the 
Kural desires inner freedom from the world and a mind free from hatred…” (quoted by 
Varadarajan, 1988, p. 68-89).  But for Schweitzer (Varadarajan, 1988, p. 170) there is more 
because Thirukkural advocates the idea of active love: “In the Kural world and life negation 
is only like a distant cloud in the sky”. According to Schweitzer (quoted by Varadarajan, 
1988, p. 171): 
 
“Whilst the Bhagavad-Gita in a forced and chilly manner gives as a motive for 
remaining in active life that it is in accordance with the order of the Universe, the 
Kural justifies it – what an advance! – by the idea of ethical activity. Work and profit 
place man in a position to do good”. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this contribution we have considered the relevance of two ancient Indian classics for the 
current problem of an ethical deficit in governance and economics in emerging markets. We 
have established that the wage structure recommended in Kautilya’s Arthashastra compared 
with the existing wage structure of the Indian bureaucracy is very egalitarian and this could 
have contributed to the lack of efficiency and ethics the wage structure recommended in 
Arthashastra (Trautman, 2012). Consequently, Kautilya demonstrated that both the wage 
levels and the wage structure of the Indian bureaucracy needs to be substantially changed. As 
humans are by nature possessive and greedy, a clean and efficient administration can only be 
achieved by higher compensation. Thiruvallavur clearly contradicts this by stating that 
humans are by nature good and that government interference in the economy has to be 
limited to certain domains. His emphasis on poverty alleviation would suggest a more 
egalitarian wage structure. 
 
In conclusion we might refer to Rousseau’s acknowledgement that every society “must 
choose between making a man or a citizen”. For Kautilya the destructive characteristics of 
man can only be corrected for the common good by making him into a citizen who works for 
the common good, symbolized by the ruler. It involves selecting the best social institutions 
that take into account man’s natural weaknesses and curb these in favour of the common 
good, even if this includes an institutionalized unequal distribution of wealth. This merely 
avoids even more unfair conditions. It is about establishing pragmatic solutions for the 
problem of the negative natural instincts of man. For Thiruvalluvar (and also Rousseau) 
Kautilya’s approach would be to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in 
order to give him a relative one. Thiruvalluvar favoured the positive original (natural) 
instincts and tried to establish ways for natural man to live within society. From this 
perspective less government would be a solution to the problem of an ethical deficit in 
governance, including corruption. 
 
Unfortunately, the Indian Independence movements did not take much into account their own 
traditions of identifying economic ethics and good governance. Thiruvalluvar, for instance, is 
only marginally included in the economic ideology of the pioneers of the Dravidian (South 
Indian liberation) movement (Santhi, 2009). In general, history, philosophy, and spirituality 
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are left out from the mainstream economics and business curricula on a worldwide scale. 
Consequently, we suggest that here are forgotten sources for creating ethical incentives in 
economics and governance today. 
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